Whether one ultimately agrees with every conclusion reached by the author is beside the point. The issues raised involve matters of significant public concern, including the District’s reported surplus, fund balance, budget transfers, staffing reductions, class-size projections, tax levy increases, compliance with transparency requirements, and the role of the State Monitor in overseeing the District’s finances.

These are not trivial questions. They go directly to whether taxpayers and voters are being provided complete and accurate information as they are asked to make decisions affecting both their wallets and their schools.

Voters have already rejected a proposed tax increase once. Yet on June 16, the District will return seeking approval of another increase — reduced from 1.99% to 1.5%. But the percentage itself is not the central issue. . .

Public confidence depends on transparency. When residents encounter apparent inconsistencies between public statements, budget documents, financial reports, and meeting presentations, those concerns should be addressed openly and directly. Questions about the use of public funds should not be dismissed simply because they are uncomfortable.

As members of this community, we believe these questions are legitimate and necessary. When residents are being asked to approve higher taxes, they are entitled to understand the District’s true financial condition and the basis for the claims being made to voters. The District leadership, Board of Education, and State Monitor should welcome the opportunity to address these issues publicly and provide the clarity the community deserves.

The public has a right to understand how decisions are being made, how taxpayer dollars are being managed, and why additional taxes are being requested. Accountability begins with answering reasonable questions.

The letter follows in full.

* * *

From: Gabriel Thompson
Subject: Request for State Monitor review and reports before the June 16 budget revote
Date: May 28, 2026 at 12:40:08 EDT

GABRIEL THOMPSON
MOUNT VERNON, NY 10552
BETWEENTHEFRAME@ICLOUD.COM
05/28/2026

DR. KIMBERLY YOUNG WILKINS
STATE MONITOR, MOUNT VERNON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT VIA EMAIL:
KYOUNGWILKINS@MTVERNONCSD.ORG

Dear Dr. Wilkins,

I am a resident and taxpayer in the Mount Vernon City School District. I’m writing because the matters below fall squarely within the duties you were appointed to carry out — keeping the District’s budget balanced and consistent with its financial plan, and notifying the Board of violations — and because the District has scheduled a budget revote for June 16 after voters rejected the original budget on May 19.

At your first public hearing you said, “Everything we do has to be transparent. Otherwise we work in a vacuum and that won’t work.” I’m holding that standard up to what I’ve found in the District’s own records, and I’m asking you to address it directly.

THE SURPLUS

At the March 10 meeting, the District Treasurer, Mr. Lin, stated on video (around the 3:15 mark) that the District is projecting to end the year net positive by $14.8 million. He described this as a net positive position even while the District says it is paying down years of backdated invoices and carrying an $8 million tax anticipation note (TAN). A district that is simultaneously clearing old bills, servicing an $8 million TAN, and still projecting a $14.8 million net positive year-end result is not a district that lacks money.

For context, in this same fiscal year — the first operating with three fewer schools — the District both reduced expenses by a stated $16.9 million (per the April 30, 2025 community message) and raised the tax levy 3.3%, generating $4,486,255 in new revenue (per the adopted budget). New York’s 4% fund balance cap on a budget this size is roughly $10.9 million; a $14.8 million net positive position would put the District well over that limit, where the excess is owed back to taxpayers through a reduced levy — not collected again through a new increase. Later documents(4/6/26) show $23.7m available appropriations(see also attached-last page of agenda item 10.5 from 4/7/26 meeting)

I also found a $1.24 million calculation error in the April treasurer’s report presented to the Board on May 19. How do we have a fiscal monitor in place, yet a member of the public can look at three numbers and see that the totals are off by more than a million dollars — and that error still makes its way into a formal presentation to the Board? Aren’t these documents produced with software that should make arithmetic mistakes like this nearly impossible? If this is what reaches the public, what does it say about what isn’t being checked behind it?

And when the public watches a meeting and hears a $14.8 million net positive declaration(3:15) with no comment from the Board or the Superintendent — and then watches the May 19 meeting(2:07) where the District describes having $20.8 million more cash on hand this year than at the same point last year, again with no comment from the Board — it raises a basic question about your role. Is it not the State Monitor’s job to speak to the public and the Board about why we are seeing these numbers, to tell us plainly that this is good news, and to put it in context?

If those conversations are instead happening behind closed doors, that is exactly what the Open Meetings Law is meant to prevent. The law requires that the public see how the decisions/sausage are/is made — not that a finished result simply be presented to us on a plate-a fait accompli. 

From where the community sits, watching these meetings, it does not appear that the business of the District is being conducted in the open the way the law requires. I would ask you, as the State’s representative in this District, to address that directly, not as you say, “in a vacuum.” 

A CONTRADICTION THAT NEEDS RESOLVING

At the special board meeting called for May 26, 2026 to present the revised budget with the 1.5% levy increase, Board President Donna Marable stated(4:00-10:00) that there were no real staff layoffs or savings from closing the three schools — characterizing the reductions as essentially a janitor here or a principal there. That directly contradicts the District’s own April 30, 2025 community message, which announced the layoff of 84 certified staff and 40 civil service employees — over 120 positions — before this current school year, and credited those actions with $16.9 million in expense reductions. See here: LINK

Both statements cannot be true. Either the District laid off over 120 people and saved $16.9 million+\-, as it announced in writing, or it did not, as Ms. Marable suggested aloud. As State Monitor, you are positioned to establish which it is, and the public is owed a clear answer before being asked to approve a tax increase.

I would also note, respectfully, that in making these financial representations Ms. Marable indicated she understands accounting and “is an accountant by trade”. Her publicly available background describes a retired educator/administrator from the Mount Vernon and Newark school systems, and I have found no record that she is a licensed CPA. I raise this only because the public is being asked to accept her characterization of the District’s finances over the District’s own written figures, and her stated basis for that authority does not match her public record. I would welcome correction if I am mistaken.

THE APRIL 7 TRANSFERS

On April 7, the Board approved $26,184,467 in transfers across 377 line items at a work session where the second agenda item, before any public comment, was to suspend the rules. Administration stated the work had been underway since August, yet the package was signed and posted the day before the vote, described as “housekeeping,” with no detailed justification for the bulk of it.

What concerns me most is the timing and the pattern. Shifting more than $26 million in the closing months of the fiscal year — out of compensation lines and into reserves, retirement, BOCES, and contractual accounts — is a recognized way to draw down a fund balance on paper before the June 30 close. The effect, whether intended or not, is to make the surplus look smaller than it is, which relieves the
pressure to return excess funds to taxpayers and lets the District avoid exceeding the 4% unappropriated fund balance cap that state law imposes. 

When a district sitting on a projected $14.8 million net positive position or more moves this much money this quickly, with this little explanation, days before a tax-increase budget vote by the board, the community is entitled to ask whether these transfers are about genuine operational need or about keeping the true size of the surplus out of public view. That is a question you, as State Monitor, are uniquely positioned to answer.

THE TRUE-UP AND THE CLASS-SIZE CLAIMS

At the same May 26 meeting, Dr. Strickland stated(10:40) that he had never done a “true-up” in the District — which he described as physically counting the actual children in each classroom to determine ratios and how classes might be combined. Minutes later, the District warned that if the budget does not pass, classes would balloon to roughly 35 students each and programs such as athletics would be cut.

I cannot reconcile those two statements. If the District has never counted how many children are actually in each classroom, it has no factual basis for predicting 30-35 students per class(12:20). One cannot credibly forecast a class-size catastrophe while admitting, in the same meeting, to never having measured class sizes, as well as sitting on millions of taxpayer dollars. 

This is especially difficult to understand under a fiscal monitor. The District closed three schools after reporting that 14 of its 16 buildings were under 50% capacity — and indicated the State had advised it could close two or three more when gathering community input and support in 2024. Yet publicly reported figures (NYSED/NCES data) put the District’s student-teacher ratio at roughly 12 to 1, well below the statewide average and far from any 35-to-1 scenario. (I recognize student-teacher ratio is not identical to class size, which is precisely why an actual true-up matters — and why its absence is so concerning.)

How, under active State monitoring, was a true-up not among the first steps taken — particularly when enrollment and building capacity were the stated justification for closing schools?

THE MARCH 10 PRESENTATION AND YOUR STATUTORY REPORTING

The March 10 meeting was billed as your presentation on the budget the District was proposing. From the video, I could not find any portion showing you presenting or analyzing the budget — only the Treasurer’s roughly three-minute report stating he expected roughly $14 million in surplus at year end. Isn’t your report on the proposed budget statutory required? 

Separately, I have been unable to locate any quarterly reports, or a semiannual/annual report, from you as State Monitor. My understanding is that your role carries statutory reporting obligations to NYSED and the public. Could you please point me to where these reports are published, and provide copies of any you have issued to date? If they have not yet been issued, I would appreciate knowing the schedule on which they will be and why not.

MY QUESTIONS TO YOU, AS STATE MONITOR:

1. Were you given advance notice of the April 7 agenda item to suspend the work session rules, and of the $26,184,467 transfer package, with the detail absent from the public materials?

2. Did you review and approve, object to, or take any position on those transfers before the vote?

3. Is the District’s projected $14.8 million net positive position consistent with the State-approved Academic Improvement and Financial Plan you are charged with monitoring?

4. Does the projected fund balance comply with the 4% statutory cap, and if it exceeds it, what is being done to return the excess to taxpayers?

5. How do you reconcile the Board President’s public statement that there were no real layoffs or savings with the District’s own written announcement of 120+ layoffs and $16.9 million in savings?

6. Did the District ever conduct a true-up of actual classroom enrollment, and if not, on what factual basis did it warn of 35 students per class and the loss of athletics if the budget fails?

7. Given that 14 of 16 buildings were reported under 50% capacity and the District’s student-teacher ratio is roughly 12 to 1, what supports the class-size warnings being made to voters?

8. Did you present a budget analysis at the March 10 meeting, and if so, where can the public view it?

9. Where are your required State Monitor reports published, and may I have copies?

10. In your assessment, is a 1.5% tax levy increase justified for a District projecting a $14.8 million net positive year-end position while paying down old invoices and an $8 million TAN?

11. Have you reported any of these concerns to NYSED or Commissioner Rosa? If not, will you?

I am not asking you to take my characterization on faith. I’m asking you to apply your own independent review to the District’s own numbers, on the record, before residents vote again on June 16.

Given that timeline, I respectfully request a written response, and I would welcome the opportunity to meet during one of your days in the District. I am also providing these concerns to the Office of the State Comptroller.

Thank you for your attention, and for the transparency standard you set for yourself publicly. The community is counting on it.

Finally, I want to give you context for the deep distrust in this community and in myself regarding this district. Over the course of several conversations, a sitting Board member, Christopher McDonough, told me — and has told other residents as well — that significant sums(millions in total were described) were overpaid to administrators, reportedly tied to staff on an 11-month schedule being paid for a 12th month or something of the sort, and that those overpayments were not recovered. He indicated the Board had been aware of the issue for roughly two years and had not acted on it. I am not in a position to independently confirm the amounts or the District’s characterization of them, which is exactly why we have sought the records.

A Freedom of Information Law request on 10/27/2025 was submitted to the District for documentation on this subject, and it has been delayed for months, with almost no responsive material provided. New York’s FOIL sets clear response timelines, and a delay of this length on a matter involving public funds is, by itself, cause for concern. The combination of what multiple residents have been told by a Board member and the District’s prolonged failure to produce records has led many of us to worry that unresolved financial issues may be among the other reasons there is more money in this year’s budget than the public has been told.

I am asking that you and Dr. Strickland ensure the District promptly meets its FOIL obligations, and that the underlying question — whether public funds were overpaid and, if so, whether they were recovered — be answered openly rather than left to rumor and delay. I have documentation of what I was told and am prepared to provide it to you and to the Office of the State Comptroller as appropriate.

Respectfully, (see attached)

Gabriel Thompson
Mount Vernon, NY 10552
betweentheframe@icloud.com

The work of the eyes is done.  Go now and do the heart-work on the images imprisoned within you-Rilke

This is a story about what grows when accountability disappears.

There are two 501(c)(3) nonprofits operating out of Room 11 at Mount Vernon City Hall. They share the same address, overlapping officers, and a board composed almost entirely of city employees. One uses the Recreation Department’s phone number. The other has the city’s Commissioner of Recreation and Commissioner of Public Works written into its bylaws as permanent board members. And in 2024, the City of Mount Vernon issued one of them $60,000 in federal pandemic relief funds, with checks approved by the same man who runs both organizations.

The first is called Friends of Mount Vernon Arts, Recreation and Youth Programs Inc. (Friends of MVARYP, EIN 90-0910967). The second is the Mount Vernon Memorial Field Foundation, Inc. (MVMFF, EIN 47-1292288). Both have websites that show very little meaningful information.

What follows is what the public records show.

THE CONTEXT: A CITY THAT STOPPED REPORTING

In September 2020, State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli released an audit of Mount Vernon’s financial reporting and oversight. City officials had not established basic financial policies or procedures. The City Comptroller failed to file the required annual financial report for fiscal years 2016 through 2019. No audited financial statements had been issued since 2015. The city had lost its credit rating.

In January 2022, a second state audit found millions in expenses not timely paid, inappropriate actions by the former city comptroller, and poor disclosure that caused ongoing legal issues. The state made 29 recommendations. DiNapoli urged Mayor Patterson-Howard and the incoming City Comptroller, Darren Morton, to implement them immediately.

As of the state’s most recent follow-up, the City’s 2021 through 2024 audits remain outstanding. The general fund deficit, last measured at $28.9 million as of December 2020, has likely grown. The city still cannot tell its own residents what its finances look like.

This is the environment in which Friends of MVARYP received $60,000 in federal money, and in which two city-run nonprofits operate out of the same room in City Hall.

THE FIRST NONPROFIT: FRIENDS OF MVARYP

Friends of MVARYP was incorporated in 2012 and received 501(c)(3) status in 2014. It operates out of City Hall, uses the Recreation Department’s phone line, and reports revenue of $300,856 for fiscal year 2024. Based on its IRS Form 990-EZ filings (available on ProPublica) and city employment records, here is its board:

Eight of nine board members are current city employees or elected officials. This is not a community organization with some government ties. It is city government running a private fundraising vehicle, one that answers to no city council, no budget hearing, no public vote, and no FOIL request.

THE SECOND NONPROFIT: MOUNT VERNON MEMORIAL FIELD FOUNDATION

Friends of MVARYP is not the only nonprofit operating out of Room 11.

The Mount Vernon Memorial Field Foundation, Inc. (MVMFF) was incorporated on April 3, 2014, under Section 402 of the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law. Its Certificate of Incorporation was filed by Darren M. Morton. Its stated purpose: to provide financial and programmatic support for the preservation, renovation, and operation of Memorial Field.

On June 5, 2024, Morton signed the organization’s Registration Statement for Charitable Organizations (CHAR410) with the New York State Attorney General’s Charities Bureau, listing himself as President and primary contact. The registration was received July 16, 2024. The foundation is registered under NY State Reg. No. 50-30-94, with its principal address at 1 Roosevelt Square, Suite 11, the same room in City Hall where Friends of MVARYP operates.

The registration lists three officers:

Every officer of the Memorial Field Foundation also serves on the board of Friends of MVARYP. All three are city employees or elected officials.

The overlap does not end with shared personnel. The MVMFF bylaws structurally embed city government into the nonprofit’s leadership: Section 6.1 mandates that the board include “the City of Mt. Vernon Commissioner of Recreation and Commissioner of Department of Public Works.” Section 6.2 confirms these commissioners serve “by appointment to the respective City office,” not by election. This is not informal overlap. It is a permanent feature of the organization’s charter.

The foundation’s Certificate of Incorporation designates process service at One Roosevelt Square, Room 11, City Hall. Its contact email is Morton’s personal Gmail.

One additional detail: according to the CHAR410, MVMFF’s federal tax-exempt status was revoked on May 17, 2017. The registration was filed June 5, 2024, seven years after revocation. Whether this represents a re-application or a registration of an organization operating without tax-exempt status is not clear from the public record.

Two nonprofits. Same City Hall address. Same president. Same treasurer. Overlapping boards. City commissioners written into the bylaws.

No resident voted for this. No city council authorized it. No public hearing examined it.

THE FEDERAL MONEY

In May 2024, Mayor Shawyn Patterson-Howard signed a formal ARPA subrecipient contract awarding Friends of MVARYP $60,000 in federal pandemic relief funds. The nonprofit was represented at signing by Kathleen Walker-Pinckney, the city’s own Recreation Commissioner, acting as the nonprofit’s Vice-President. The city’s Department of Planning and Community Development administered the contract.

The city issued two checks from the Office of the Comptroller: $30,000 on July 15, 2024 (Check No. 160381), and $30,000 on October 8, 2024 (Check No. 161390). Both payable to Friends of MVARYP at 1 Roosevelt Square, Room 11, City Hall. Payment vouchers require Comptroller approval.

The Comptroller is Darren Morton. The President of Friends of MVARYP is Darren Morton. The President of the Memorial Field Foundation is also Darren Morton. His office approved disbursements to an organization he leads, while simultaneously leading a second nonprofit out of the same office.

The contract’s Section 16, Conflict of Interest, states:

“The Subrecipient warrants that no part of the total Contract Amount shall be paid, directly or indirectly to an employee or official of the City/County as wages, compensation or gifts.”

The nonprofit’s board is composed almost entirely of city employees and officials. The contract contains a clause it cannot truthfully sign, and the city signed it anyway.

THE FIRE RELIEF SOLICITATION

On November 24, 2025, a fire tore through a residential building at 30 Cottage Avenue in Mount Vernon. Mayor Patterson-Howard responded on her official city Facebook page, directing all monetary donations to Friends of MVARYP, with Zelle payments to Accounting@friendsofmountvernon.org. Gift cards were to be dropped at the Office of the Mayor.

Click here for full-size image

No independent charity. No escrow account. No public accounting. The mayor used the authority of her office to channel disaster relief donations into a nonprofit controlled by city hall employees. As of publication, no accounting of those funds has been made public.

THE CITY COUNCIL WAS ASKED TO BLESS IT

On the evening of March 9, 2026, the Mount Vernon City Council held a work session. Item 12 on the referral packet read:

“An Ordinance Authorizing Continued Co-Sponsorship between the Mount Vernon Recreation Department, Youth Bureau, and Friends of Mount Vernon Arts, Recreation & Youth Programs, Inc. for Community Programming and Special Events.”

The attached letter, submitted by Commissioner Walker-Pinckney and Executive Director Burrell-Butler, requests Council approval of a formal, ongoing agreement allowing the nonprofit to “accept monetary donations to continue funding special events hosted by the Recreation and Youth Bureau Departments.” The stated reason: “current budget constraints.”

That is a direct, written admission that Friends of MVARYP exists to move public-purpose money outside the budget process, bypassing city council appropriations, public hearings, and Freedom of Information Law.

The co-sponsorship request was submitted on Friends of MVARYP letterhead, but that letterhead lists the city’s own website (cmvny.com), the Recreation Department’s Facebook page, and the Recreation Department’s phone and fax numbers. The nonprofit has no independent institutional identity. The signatories used their government titles: Walker-Pinckney signed as “Commissioner,” Burrell-Butler as “Executive Director.” City officials using government authority to advocate for a contract between the city and a nonprofit they lead is a textbook Public Officers Law §74 conflict, documented, signed, and submitted to a legislative body.

Click here to see the full referral and letter.

And the word “continued” is telling. They are not asking to create this relationship. They are asking the Council to formalize one that has already been running without legislative authorization.

Approval does not shield anyone from legal exposure. But it creates institutional cover and makes future accountability harder.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE

Think about how many hands this agenda item passed through before it reached the public. Someone drafted the letter. Someone formatted it on nonprofit letterhead listing city phone numbers. Someone packaged it into the referral packet. Someone assigned it an item number. Someone distributed it to Council members. Someone posted the agenda.

At every step, a city employee had the opportunity to say: wait a minute. A nonprofit run entirely by city employees, operating out of City Hall, using city phone lines, chaired by the city’s own Comptroller, is asking the Council to authorize it to raise money for city programs outside the budget. The letter is signed by two department heads using their government titles. The word “continued” tells you this has been running without authorization.

Nobody stopped it. Nobody flagged it. Nobody said this needs legal review before it goes to a vote.

That silence is not a procedural lapse. It is an institutional failure. The systems meant to catch conflicts of interest, to ensure public money moves through public processes, to protect taxpayers from self-dealing, have either broken down or were never functioning.

The individual conflicts in this article are serious. But an entire administrative apparatus processing this referral without a single objection may be the most damning detail of all. It suggests the arrangement is not being hidden. It is simply normal. The people inside City Hall do not see the problem, because the problem is the culture they work in every day.

WHAT THIS MEANS

New York Public Officers Law §74 prohibits public employees from engaging in activities that create a substantial conflict with their official duties. Federal ARPA regulations under 2 CFR §200.318 require conflict of interest disclosures and prohibit officials from participating in grants in which they have a personal interest. The city administered $60,000 in federal money through an arrangement that violates the plain terms of both standards.

Mount Vernon spent years unable to account for public money. The state documented the failures. Officials promised reform. And while reform was being promised, while the audits remained unfinished and the credit rating stayed suspended, city officials were building a parallel financial structure: two nonprofits, same City Hall office, same leadership, funded first by private donations, then by federal ARPA funds, and potentially to be formally ratified by the City Council as standard operating procedure.

Mount Vernon residents deserve a government that spends public money in public. What is described here is the opposite of that.

The conversation was direct. Mount Vernon is not experiencing a one-year budget problem. The city has no bond rating, no completed audits since 2020, no reserve funds, and over $60 million in unpaid property taxes. Property taxes have risen more than 40% over the last five years while city services have declined. The City Comptroller has warned that insolvency is possible within two years.

This is not news to Albany. The New York State Comptroller’s office has audited Mount Vernon’s finances multiple times and found serious failures each time. A 2020 audit found that the city had not filed required annual financial reports for fiscal years 2016 through 2019, had produced no audited financial statements since 2015, and had lost its credit rating as a result. A follow-up audit released in January 2022 documented 29 separate recommendations to overhaul the city comptroller’s office, after finding unauthorized electronic disbursements totaling $16.4 million, millions in unpaid bills, and a near-total absence of financial controls. The state has flagged these problems. The city has not fixed them.

Assemblyman Pretlow indicated he is well aware of Mount Vernon’s financial condition. He expressed support for the concept of a state financial monitor and stated that if the Mount Vernon City Council passed a resolution requesting one, he would champion it at the state level.

That last part matters.

A state financial monitor cannot be imposed from Albany without local action first. Under New York’s home rule framework, the City Council must move first. A council resolution requesting state oversight would give the Assemblyman the political and procedural footing to act.

This is now a question for Mount Vernon’s elected council members.

MVCIP’s position is straightforward: the city’s fiscal problems are structural, not cyclical. They will not resolve themselves through another tax increase or another year of delayed audits. Meaningful oversight, with real authority and clear exit conditions, is what a responsible path forward looks like.

We will be bringing this message directly to city council members in the weeks ahead. We encourage residents to do the same.

Download our full report on the fiscal emergency in Mount Vernon here.

It is reflected in the 5.5% property tax increase, the consistent appearance of new fees, the current fees that multiply with every tax bill, and a municipal budget that shows a city spending roughly two dollars for every dollar it brings in. It is visible in aging infrastructure, flooding, deteriorating buildings, and departments that struggle to deliver basic services.

Against that backdrop, the City’s recent spending decisions deserve scrutiny.

$20,800 in Conference Travel

At the March 3 meeting of the Board of Estimate & Contract, the City approved five out-of-town conference trips totaling $13,800.

Those approvals follow another $7,000 in conference travel approved the previous month.

In two months, that is $20,800 in conference travel.

All approved unanimously. With virtually no discussion. Comptroller Darren Morton asked a few questions — but in the end, he did what he always does…

The “Free” Trip That Isn’t Free

One of the approved trips sends the Building Commissioner, Patrick Holder, to Las Vegas for four days to attend the Laserfiche Empower Conference at the Mandalay Bay Resort.

City officials noted that conference registration is covered by a third party. That does not make the trip free — far from it.

The City is still paying his salary, benefits, travel and lodging, and four days of lost work time.

The Building Department

The Las Vegas trip is particularly offensive given the condition of Mount Vernon’s Building Department, which residents and contractors regularly describe as a Kafkaesque nightmare.

• Permits routinely sit for months or years. I have personally been waiting an obscene amount of time to close a simple solar permit.
• Code enforcement is nearly nonexistent, and what enforcement does occur is wildly inconsistent.
• Buildings across Mount Vernon are literally falling apart. Just recently, a hole was discovered — by a resident — in the top deck of the Sidney Avenue parking garage, forcing part of the structure to close.
• And the Building Department itself — with its yellowed, crumbling, mold-infested walls — is a disgusting symbol of the City’s neglect. The condition of the office perfectly reflects the condition of the system it runs.

Under these circumstances, sending the department head — or any department employee — across the country to a resort conference in Las Vegas is not just inappropriate, it is outrageous. And it is one more slap in the face to the hardworking Mount Vernon taxpayers who are expected to foot the bill for a government that cannot even perform its most basic functions.

The Building Commissioner — especially this Building Commissioner — should be in the office fixing the department, not flying to Nevada for a four-day resort junket. The Building Department already has a Laserfiche contract. What it does not have is a functioning operation. And even if that conference offered something of genuine value, Laserfiche is records management software — not a tool the Building Commissioner should be running or overseeing in the first place. This is not a trip that required the commissioner. It was a trip the commissioner decided to take.

A Convenient Loophole

Another approved trip highlights a structural issue.

The Board of Water Supply received approval for a conference in Charlotte, North Carolina, on the ground that it operates outside the City’s austerity review protocols.

If austerity is real, however, it should apply everywhere our tax dollars are used, and the Board of Water Supply is most certainly wetting their beaks. In fact, Mount Vernon water bills just recently increased.

Austerity measures should apply not only to the Board of Water Supply, but also to the Mount Vernon Urban Renewal Agency and the Mount Vernon Industrial Development Agency.

At present, it does not. What sense does that make?

Meanwhile . . . a Portrait Ceremony

While approving travel under an austerity budget, the City is also planning a ceremony to unveil a portrait of former Comptroller Maureen Walker later this month.

That raises a simple question: Who is paying for the portrait?

If taxpayer funds are involved, residents deserve to know.

The ceremony also carries a certain irony.

Former Comptroller Deborah Reynolds has absorbed no shortage of blame over the past six years — from many of the very same officials now organizing this ceremony. But the problems did not start with Reynolds.

Maureen Walker served as Comptroller during former Mayor Ernie Davis’ tenure — a period marked by corruption and fiscal mismanagement that helped set the stage for the crisis Mount Vernon is living through today. The Comptroller’s job is to be a check on exactly that kind of behavior: to watch the books, flag the problems, and protect the public. Walker kept things looking orderly. What she did not do was sound the alarm. Whether she failed to see what was happening, or simply chose not to say anything, the result was the same.

So the ceremony carries a particular irony. The officials who spent years pointing fingers at Reynolds are now unveiling a portrait of the comptroller who came before her — the one who kept things looking fine while the foundation cracked.

So the real question is not simply whether Walker deserves a portrait. The real question is why Mount Vernon keeps honoring the very people who brought it to where it is right now.

This is performative nonsense. And it is exactly what we have come to expect from this administration.

Austerity Means Choices

Austerity is not a slogan. It is a set of priorities.

Mount Vernon residents are paying higher taxes, higher fees, and watching basic services continue to deteriorate.

City Hall is paying for unnecessary conferences, travel, and ceremonies.

If that’s what austerity looks like, it’s no wonder the City’s finances never improve.

This is not about politics, personalities, or one anomalous budget year.

Mount Vernon is in a structural fiscal emergency, and pretending otherwise is no longer just dishonest – it’s dangerous.

For more than a decade, the City has stumbled from crisis to crisis, relying on tax hikes, expensive short-term borrowing, and accounting improvisation to paper over deeper failures. The result is a government that costs more every year, delivers less, and has lost the basic ability to manage its own finances.

At this point, the question is no longer whether Mount Vernon has a problem.

The question is: Why the State is still allowing it to continue?

Financial Distress – In Real Life, In Real Time

Let’s start with the basics.

Large budget-to-actual variances are a classic warning sign of weak financial controls. When projections routinely miss reality by millions of dollars, budgeting stops being planning and becomes theater.

Mount Vernon’s 2024 Budget vs. Actuals reveal that revenues and expenses missed their targets across multiple major categories — not at the margins, but at levels significant enough to reshape the City’s fiscal picture.

The Collapse of the Fund Balance

Mount Vernon’s fund balance — the municipal equivalent of a rainy-day savings account — fell from a healthy surplus in the early 2010s to a deeply negative position by 2019–2020.

A negative fund balance means the City spent money it did not have — not as the product of a single bad year, a recession, or the pandemic — but as the predictable result of years of unrealistic budgets and weak controls in which the budgeting process ceased to function as a real planning tool.

Long-Term Liabilities vs. Net Position

As cash reserves disappeared, long-term obligations moved in the opposite direction.

Mount Vernon’s bonded debt, accrued benefits, and other long-term liabilities rose sharply over the same period that its net position flipped from positive to deeply negative — a clear signal of structural insolvency, not a temporary cash crunch.

In plain terms: Mount Vernon owes far more than it owns, with no credible plan to close the gap.

Taxes Keep Rising, the System Keeps Failing, and the Numbers Don’t Add Up

Years of outsized property tax increases have not stabilized Mount Vernon’s finances. They have concealed deeper failures while shifting more of the burden onto residents.

Since 2012, the City has routinely overridden the state tax cap, exceeding it by a cumulative 34.73%.

Over just the last five years, residents have absorbed more than 40% in cumulative tax increases, including add-on sewer and garbage fees.

Since 2001, Mount Vernon property taxes have risen 44% faster than inflation.

That is not a revenue problem. It is a governance problem.

Missing Bond Rating, Missing Discipline

Despite ever-higher taxes:

• Mount Vernon still has no bond rating
• It holds no meaningful reserves
• Audits after 2020 remain incomplete
• The City continues to rely on tax anticipation notes — essentially high-interest payday loans — just to operate

Higher taxes are not stabilizing the system. They are feeding a cycle of dysfunction.

The Economy Is Sending a Warning

The most overlooked red flag—and one of the clearest—is sales tax.

Over two years, Mount Vernon’s sales tax collections fell by 7%, even as neighboring cities continued to grow. That is not normal volatility — it signals economic stress and declining commercial activity.

This makes Mount Vernon an outlier – and not in a good way.

Sales tax declines mean fewer transactions, fewer customers, and fewer businesses succeeding locally. It’s what happens when a city is unpredictable, poorly managed, and hostile to investment.

You cannot tax your way out of that.

Unpaid Taxes and Selective Enforcement Are Breaking The System

While residents are asked to pay more, the City is sitting on over $60 million in unpaid property taxes.

Repeated tax amnesties have failed. Standard enforcement tools — including foreclosure — have been applied inconsistently or avoided altogether.

The predictable result is a system in which compliant taxpayers subsidize chronic nonpayment, while leadership sidesteps politically difficult decisions.

The administration wants you to cloak its poor choices in the language of compassion; in truth, those decisions amount to fiscal malpractice.

A Missed ARPA Opportunity

The American Rescue Plan Act delivered $41 million to Mount Vernon — a once-in-a-generation chance to stabilize finances and rebuild trust after COVID.

Instead, Mount Vernon’s ARPA spending revealed the same patterns:

• • Weak documentation
  • Emergency-style decision making
  • Minimal transparency
  • Little connection between spending and measurable outcomes

Taken together, these patterns show a system that does not function the way a responsible government should.

That is why the debate cannot be limited to whether particular purchases were technically “allowed.” The real problem is that the City still lacked basic institutional financial controls when they were needed most.

MVCIP’s ARPA series explores how Mount Vernon squandered this opportunity.

Why a State Financial Monitor Is Necessary

Local self-correction is no longer credible.

A state financial monitor is not punishment — it is damage control.

Effective oversight would:

• Enforce timely audits and reporting
• Require a realistic multi-year financial plan
• Review risky borrowing and major contracts
• Mandate a serious tax enforcement strategy
• Restore credibility with residents, vendors, and markets

Oversight should be temporary, enforceable, and benchmark-driven — with clear exit conditions once the City proves it can govern responsibly.

The Time for “Wait and See” Is Over

Mount Vernon’s current trajectory is unsustainable — last-minute budgets, blown tax caps, and manufactured emergencies are not “governance.”

The State must act now: impose oversight, restore basic controls, and protect residents before a preventable crisis becomes irreversible.

*Figures shown are publicly available at mountvernoncitizen.org. Chris McDonough and mountvernoncitizen.org are not affiliated with the Civic Integrity Project.

A Mount Vernon resident noticed that his tax bill had increased by more than the 5.47% adopted by City Council. He spoke to another resident, who spoke to another, who checked her mother’s tax bill and noticed something even worse: an increase of nearly 7.5%.

Digging deeper, she found the real problem — one that should have set off alarms inside City Hall immediately: the low-income senior refuse fee had increased from $55 to $110.

A 100% increase.

Not a rounding error.

Not “a few dollars.”

A doubling — for low-income seniors.

This didn’t happen because a computer glitched or a line of code went rogue. It happened because City Council adopted legislation that, as written, authorized the increase — and the Assessor did exactly what the law told her to do.

The City’s Comptroller, Dr. Darren Morton, confirmed in writing that:

• The legislation increased the low-income senior refuse fee from $50 (or $55) to $110
• The regular refuse fee increased from $200 to $225 — a 12.5% increase
• His understanding was that the senior fee was supposed to increase by $5 — to $60 — not by $55, to $110

Read that again – low-income seniors: +$55 (or $60); everyone else: +$25

This wasn’t just harsh — it was sloppy. Sloppy enough to double a fee in law, pass it through City Council, place it on tax bills, and mail it out to residents without a single person stopping to ask the most basic question: does this make sense?

But nobody caught it. Nobody flagged it. Nobody warned residents.

To his credit, when the resident raised the issue, the Comptroller responded (a rarity in City Hall, unless the response is to be nasty on social media). But the resident had to email repeatedly for updates, and nearly two weeks passed. Two weeks, and still:

• No public notice
• No immediate correction
• No clear answer about refunds

All while the January 31 payment deadline loomed.

That delay creates a second injustice: many seniors may already have paid the inflated bill — because most people don’t assume the City accidentally doubled a fee targeting low-income seniors.

Hopefully, City Hall will issue credits automatically, and seniors won’t have to fight to get their own money back. Government shouldn’t run on hope—but all too often, that’s all Mount Vernon residents are left with.

What Should You Do Now?

Mount Vernon taxpayers should not assume their bills are correct. This episode makes clear that the City isn’t checking them — so residents have to.

• Pull out your 2025 and 2026 tax bills
• Calculate your actual percentage increase
• Look closely at fees, not just taxes — because fees are the other way this City raises taxes without calling them taxes
• If something doesn’t add up, ask questions — in writing
• Make a record. Keep it.

Because if the City can accidentally double a fee for low-income seniors, it can make other mistakes too — and it won’t catch them unless residents do.

Stay frosty, folks — because your local government isn’t.

That is how long it took the Mount Vernon City Council to pass a 5.47% property tax increase for 2026, override New York State’s 2% tax cap by supermajority vote, and approve a so-called “declaration of necessity” by the Mayor – a maneuver that was presented as somehow making this entire exercise legal.

The vote took place in a hastily scheduled “Special Meeting” on a Tuesday afternoon at 4:30 p.m., a time when it would be difficult for most working residents to attend. The date was December 18, less than one week before Christmas.

This is not where the process started.

In the weeks leading up to the vote, residents were told the increase would be 5.47%, then 6.09%, then closer to 8%, and only days before the final vote were told it would be again – 5.47%. By the time the gavel came down, the process had become a blur of shifting figures, rushed meetings, and improvised explanations – all culminating in a decision that permanently raises taxes for thousands of Mount Vernon households.

The Mayor held the public hearing on the tax cap override law at 9.45am on December 30 – twelve days after the City Council had passed it.

One Day’s Notice for a Permanent Tax Increase

On December 17, 2025, residents learned – via a City Facebook post — that the City Council would hold a special meeting the very next day, December 18 at 4:30 p.m., to vote on a tax cap override and the FY 2026 budget.

One day’s notice.

Overriding the state tax cap is not routine. Under New York law, it is an extraordinary act meant to be used sparingly and only with heightened public notice, deliberation, and transparency.

In Mount Vernon, according to analysis by the blog Mount Vernon Citizen, exceeding the New York State property tax cap has become the norm, not the exception.

Here is the rub: overriding the tax cap requires the City Council to pass a law, not just a simple ordinance – with significantly more stringent notice and public hearing requirements. The Mayor circumvented that process through a same-day “declaration of necessity,” effectively declaring an emergency despite the absence of any actual emergency or sudden fiscal shock.

There was no natural disaster. No unexpected revenue collapse. No new information that had not already been known for months – or years.

The only urgency was getting the vote done before the cash-strapped City ran out of money due to an absence of sound financial planning. By late 2025, the City had already taken out a $6.5 million Tax Anticipation Note – the equivalent of a high-interest payday loan – after running out of cash before the end of the fiscal year. Before the year was over, on December 31, the City Comptroller announced publicly that 2026 tax bills had already been mailed and were available online, encouraging residents to pay promptly.

Mount Vernon is an outlier as far as constantly overriding the New York State tax cap is concerned. Our surrounding communities usually stay below it – and did so this year:

Westchester Comparison: Mount Vernon as an Outlier

Paying More, While Existing Taxes Go Uncollected

This vote did not happen in isolation.

Over the past five years, Mount Vernon residents have absorbed nearly 40% in cumulative tax increases and add-on fees, while living with:

• • Perpetually poor service quality
  • Visible deterioration across major corridors
  • Departments failing basic performance standards
  • Chronic delays in required audits

At the same time, the City carries approximately $52 million in unpaid property taxes. Roughly 1,200 of the City’s 12,000 properties were recently eligible for foreclosure. The City has not foreclosed on a single property in more than a decade. Instead of collecting what is owed, City Hall repeatedly returns to the same solution: raise taxes on the residents, who already pay.

A Budget Without Reform Is Just a Bill

The 2026 budget contains no credible structural reform plan. There is no multiyear financial strategy. No explanation for why revenue projections should suddenly be trusted. No plan to revive commercial corridors. No roadmap connecting higher taxes to improved outcomes.

The New York State Comptroller has documented these failures for years: unrealistic budgeting, incomplete audits, underbudgeted expenses, overestimated revenues, and an inability to plan beyond the next fiscal year. Raising taxes without fixing the system that mismanages them is not governance – it is governmental malpractice.

The Charter Was Ignored – Again

Mount Vernon’s City Charter exists to prevent exactly this kind of rushed, opaque decision-making. In a December 2025 follow-up letter, the New York State Comptroller explicitly warned that Mount Vernon continued to disregard Charter-mandated budget procedures – deficiencies that remained only partially corrected. Despite that warning, the City once again compressed the process, introduced key legislation at the last minute, and pushed through a tax cap override under conditions that undermined transparency and meaningful public participation.

This is no longer ignorance. It is willful repetition of an unlawful practice.

The Outcome Was Decided Before the Public Spoke

Residents showed up. They demonstrated with signs in front of City Hall. The chambers were full. Speakers raised detailed objections: about legality, process, numbers, and trust. None of it mattered. The votes were locked in. Two Council members phoned it in  remotely via Zoom. Public participation was permitted – but functionally meaningless.  This is not how democratic decision-making is supposed to work.

Predictable. Preventable. Repeated.

City officials say they had no choice. That is not true.

This outcome was the foreseeable result of years of poor decision making: treating tax cap overrides as routine, delaying audits, ignoring Charter deadlines, failing to collect existing revenue, and papering over structural problems with short-term fixes.

Unless Mount Vernon stops governing by crisis and starts governing by rules, residents will be back here next year – having the same fight, with a bigger bill.

Rather than closing out a deliberate and transparent recovery effort, the City’s final ARPA expenditures reinforce a pattern evident since 2021—fragmented decision-making, weak internal controls, and little evidence that spending was aligned with direct, accountable community outcomes. Compounding the problem, the City never developed a coherent recovery plan. As the December 31, 2024, obligation deadline approached, 2024 devolved into a rushed effort to obligate funds and execute contracts. Predictably, haste produced errors.

Several 2025 expenditures appear not to have been timely, legally, obligated at all. That, however, did not stop the City from cutting checks.

For example:

• On February 25, 2025, the City issued a check for $75,885 to Don Brown Bus Sales, Inc., but there is no indication in the file showing that this money was obligated prior to December 31, 2024.
• On February 25, 2025, the City issued a check for $112.,943.36 to MES Service Company LLC to purchase equipment for the fire department. However, while the legislation authorizing the purchase occurred in 2024, the City did not obligate itself to make the purchase until 2025.

The year also saw nearly $1 million spent on building repairs for facilities that remain leaky and dilapidated; additional vehicle purchases; more software—some involving recurring costs the City neither planned for nor can afford; and yet another gift card program. A snapshot of the City’s 2025 ARPA spending appears below.

I. The City’s Own Blueprint—and Its Failure to Follow It

In 2024, the City unveiled the “Mount Vernon First: Small Business Grant” program as its flagship ARPA-based recovery initiative. On paper, it was robust:

• Clear eligibility criteria
• Defined geographic focus (Downtown Business District)
• A competitive application window
• A 120-point scoring rubric and individual evaluator scorecards
• Interviews and rankings
• Restricted uses of funds
• Monitoring, site visits, and documentation requirements

The City represented to the public—and to the federal government—that ARPA funds would be deployed through a structured, merit-based, documented process designed to spur recovery and revitalization.

The records tell a different story.

II. What the Files Actually Contain—and What They Do Not

Across the ARPA grants disbursed in late 2024 and throughout 2025, the City’s files fairly consistently include executed contracts, claim vouchers, and issued checks. But they just as consistently do not include:

• Proof that funded projects occurred
• Receipts or invoices tied to eligible uses
• Photographs of completed work, site visit reports, or completion certifications
• Monitoring or compliance memoranda
• Outcome or impact summaries

In short, the files show authorization and payment, but not performance or results.

That is not a clerical oversight. Under ARPA, the obligation to ensure compliance does not end when a check is cut. It begins there.

III. The Small Business Grants: Recovery in Name Only

ARPA’s small business grants were typically capped at $25,000 and often paid in two installments—sometimes months after the contract period had ended. While the City justified these grants as relief for “negative economic impacts of COVID-19,” the underlying uses frequently included: rent arrears, utilities, payroll, marketing, inventory, equipment, vehicle purchases, and general operating expenses.

Many of these uses stretch, if not exceed, the program’s own stated purposes, which emphasized façade improvements, build-outs, exterior work, and code compliance tied to downtown revitalization. More importantly, the files do not demonstrate that the funded activities actually occurred, let alone that they addressed pandemic-related harm.

IV. What If You Knew: A Case Study in Process Breakdown

One grant illustrates the systemic failures especially clearly.

The business What If You Knew received a $25,000 ARPA small business grant, justified as pandemic recovery assistance. The contract—executed only by the recipient—contained a clearly computer-generated signature, without an accompanying audit trail or signature certificate. While electronic signatures are legally permissible, the absence of authentication metadata in a federally funded contract weakens the integrity of the record.

More troubling is what is missing:

• No lease documentation
• No renovation or build-out receipts
• No permits
• No proof of expansion
• No expenditure report—despite the contract explicitly requiring one
• No monitoring or follow-up

The proposed use of funds—marketing, staffing, and contingency planning—also diverged from the core design of the Mount Vernon First program, which prioritized physical improvements and downtown storefront activation. In any event, there is no trace of a business operating under the name What If You Knew in downtown Mount Vernon. While the New York State Department of State lists the entity as “active,” its address remains the single-family home listed in the contract.

Whether this grant was well-intentioned is beside the point. The City cannot demonstrate that it complied with its own rules or with ARPA’s accountability requirements.

V. The Illusion of Oversight

The City produced scorecards, rubrics, FAQs, and selection packets that suggest rigor and discipline. But these materials largely exist in isolation, detached from the grant files themselves.

For many recipients:

• Scorecards are missing
• Rankings are undocumented
• Interview notes are absent
• Final selection rationales are unclear

Compounding these deficiencies, the review team consisted of the Mayor’s Deputy Chief of Staff and the Comptroller’s Assistant Comptroller—the same Assistant Comptroller whose father benefitted from ARPA funds when the City spent $72,000 to demolish his long-neglected property.

Once again, the City appeared unconcerned with substantive review or even the appearance of impropriety. What resulted was the appearance of oversight, not its substance.

VI. The Gift Cards That Couldn’t Be Used

The lack of follow-through and verification in Mount Vernon’s ARPA spending is not limited to small business grants. It also appears in resident-facing public safety initiatives, including programs involving cash-equivalent gift cards—one of the highest-risk forms of public expenditure.

In late 2024, the City used $61,835 in ARPA funds to purchase 400 prepaid Visa gift cards, each valued at $150, plus associated fees, for a program labeled the “Neighborhood Camera Program.” The purchase was processed through Commerce Bank and paid directly by the City. The authorizing ordinance describes a structured program: residents would receive gift cards to purchase security cameras, eligibility would be based on neighborhood need and crime data, and participants would agree to provide camera footage to the Mount Vernon Police Department if requested.

However, as with other ARPA programs, what the City’s files do not contain is equally important. There is no documentation showing:

• how recipients were selected,
• who received the cards,
• when or how the cards were activated,
• whether the cards were successfully redeemed, or
• whether cameras were ever purchased or installed.

Nor do the files include serial-number logs, distribution acknowledgements, redemption confirmations, or post-program reports—controls that are standard when public funds are converted into gift cards.

This absence of documentation is especially troubling in light of community reports that residents who attempted to redeem gift cards from a separate, earlier City-run gun buyback program found that the cards had no funds available when presented for use. According to residents, the cards were distributed, but the money “never went on the cards.”

Each gift card program involved different vendors, amounts, and inventories. What remained constant was City coordination—and a near-total failure of internal controls. Time and again, ARPA funds were used to purchase gift cards with no records demonstrating activation, distribution, or successful use.

Gift cards are not inherently improper. But they are inherently high-risk, precisely because once funds leave the City in that form, they are difficult to trace without strict controls. The City’s ARPA files show the money being spent—but not the programs being executed.

VII. The Final Accounting: Less Than Recovery, More Than Risk

By the end of 2025, Mount Vernon had expended or obligated virtually all of its $41,108,657 ARPA allocation. And yet:

• Less than 5% went to direct assistance for residents
• Community-facing programs lack proof of delivery
• Small business grants lack proof of performance
• The City absorbed long-term costs it cannot sustain
• The public was left without a transparent accounting

ARPA was meant to stabilize households, strengthen systems, and reduce future fiscal stress. In Mount Vernon, it did none of those things. Instead, it enriched City Hall.

VIII. Conclusion: Haphazard Spending Is Not Recovery

The ARPA era in Mount Vernon ends not with recovery, but with a reckoning.

The federal government entrusted Mount Vernon with more than $41 million in emergency relief—one-time funding meant to stabilize finances, protect residents, and prevent exactly the kind of fiscal collapse the City now faces. What residents received instead was a 5.47% property-tax increase, nearly non-existent services, unchecked crime, rampant homelessness, filthy streets, and so many fires that one resident publicly asked, “Is Mount Vernon Hell?”

Residents were never meaningfully prioritized. Developers dominated decision-making. And the City’s finances are weaker than before the money arrived.

This outcome was not inevitable. It was chosen.

City leadership failed to produce a comprehensive recovery strategy. They failed to adopt a disciplined plan to stabilize City finances or reduce long-term risk. They failed to create any framework that prioritized residents over vendors, insiders, or politically favored projects. They failed to impose guardrails to prevent one-time federal dollars from being used to create recurring costs the City could not sustain. Oversight was treated as optional. Documentation was treated as an inconvenience. Proof of results was treated as unnecessary.

And when the money ran out, the bill was handed to taxpayers.

Mount Vernon’s ARPA story is one of failed oversight at every level—local, state, and federal. It is a story of greed, corruption, and incompetence, of extraordinary public resources poured into a system that lacked the discipline, transparency, and integrity required to manage them. It is a story of misaligned incentives, where insiders benefited while residents paid more for less. It is the story of what happens when “free” money is given to people who think it is okay to give themselves 40% raises with back pay, buried in a contingency line and justified under an obscure provision of state law the public was never informed about. It is a story about the abject failure of the checks and balances on which our system of government relies.

In the end, a struggling city received a once-in-a-lifetime infusion of cash—roughly a quarter of its annual budget—and the people in charge still managed to drive it into bankruptcy. That is not bad luck. It is not misfortune. It is what happens when those entrusted with public money choose themselves over the people they were supposed to serve.

* * * *

This concludes The Sunday Series: ARPA in Mount Vernon.

Our next series, PILOTs, Politics, and the Public Cost, will examine the Mount Vernon Industrial Development Agency (IDA) and the unchecked expansion of developer-driven low-income housing, focusing on how these deals are structured, who benefits, and what they cost the public. That series, along with prior installments of ARPA in Mount Vernon, and other City-related material, is available at The Integrity Project’s website: https://mvcip.org/.

The letter, signed by Deputy Comptroller Robin L. Lois, summarizes more than four years of findings by the Division of Local Government and School Accountability, including repeated breakdowns in oversight, missing financial records, unreliable budgets, and weak internal controls.

Three Major State Audits, Dozens of Warnings

According to the Comptroller’s office, three major reports issued between 2020 and 2022 identified a total of 54 recommendations aimed at improving Mount Vernon’s financial management and operations.

2020 Financial Reporting and Oversight Audit

The September 2020 audit found that City officials lacked the basic financial information needed to manage operations effectively. Among the most serious findings:

• The City Comptroller failed to file required annual financial reports for fiscal years 2016–2019.
• No audited financial statements had been issued since 2015.
• The City Council did not take sufficient action to obtain accurate financial information.
• Officials lacked the data needed to develop multiyear or capital plans.
• There were no policies ensuring routine access to budget-to-actual or cash-flow reports.

In short, basic financial visibility — a prerequisite for responsible governance — was missing.

2021 Budget Review: Unrealistic Assumptions and Risky Projections

A follow-up budget review issued in April 2021 found that Mount Vernon’s adopted budget relied on revenue and expenditure assumptions that were not reasonable or supportable.

The Comptroller’s office warned that:

• The City relied on uncertain or one-time revenue sources.
• Revenues were overestimated.
• Appropriations were underbudgeted.
• The adopted budget created a risk of worsening fiscal instability and cash-flow shortages.

That review included 14 recommendations aimed at stabilizing budgeting practices and preventing further financial deterioration.

2022 Audit: Breakdown in Disbursement Oversight

A January 2022 audit focused on non-payroll disbursements revealed further governance failures.

According to the Comptroller’s office, the City Council and former Comptroller failed to properly oversee spending and did not ensure that basic financial controls were in place.

• Non-payroll disbursements were not properly or transparently accounted for.
• Payments were delayed, contributing to litigation.
• The City incurred additional, potentially unnecessary legal costs.
• Policies and procedures governing disbursements were either missing or inadequate.
• Staff lacked clear guidance on how payments were supposed to be processed.

That audit alone included 29 recommendations aimed at restoring basic fiscal controls.

Ongoing Monitoring — and Continuing Noncompliance

The Comptroller’s letter confirms that the State is still monitoring Mount Vernon and is currently conducting a follow-up review to assess whether the City has implemented the recommendations from the 2020 audit.

Notably, the letter states that Mount Vernon remains delinquent in filing its Annual Financial Reports (AFRs) for 2021 through 2024.

While the Comptroller’s office provides training, technical assistance, and reminders, it acknowledges that it cannot compel local officials to file required reports or adopt corrective measures.

Limits of State Authority

The letter also addresses calls for a state-appointed fiscal monitor for the City of Mount Vernon.

According to the Comptroller’s office, such a monitor cannot be appointed unilaterally. Doing so would require specific legislative authorization, similar to the provision included in the 2024–25 State Budget that allowed a monitor to be appointed for the Mount Vernon City School District.

What This Means for Residents

Taken together, the Comptroller’s response confirms what years of audits have already documented: long-standing weaknesses in financial oversight, reporting, and accountability — combined with limited enforcement tools when local officials fail to act.

The letter underscores a core tension in New York’s system of local government oversight: the State can identify problems, issue warnings, and recommend reforms, but compliance ultimately depends on local leadership unless the Legislature intervenes.

Why This Matters

Reliable financial reporting is not a technical detail. It is the foundation for budgeting, service delivery, taxpayer trust, and lawful governance.

Without accurate records, timely audits, and enforceable oversight, residents are left in the dark — and the risks of mismanagement, waste, and instability grow.

The Comptroller’s December 19 letter provides a rare, consolidated acknowledgment from the State itself of the depth and persistence of Mount Vernon’s fiscal governance failures — and the structural limits on the State’s ability to step in without legislative action.

Read the full Letter from the Office of the New York State Comptroller, December 19, 2025.

Instead, 2024 brought more of the same: lack of planning, random spending, fabricated emergencies, and more vehicles. One thing did change, however. For the first time, ARPA spending began to include items that appeared to be direct community support—“community development,” “small business grants,” program checks, and resident-facing initiatives. In most cities, this would have been a positive development.

But this is Mount Vernon.

And while Mount Vernon is good at spending other people’s money, ARPA wasn’t just about cutting checks. It required documentation, controls, procurement discipline, and, when third parties were paid to deliver services, real oversight. The City’s 2024 reporting shows money leaving City Hall, but records produced in response to our FOIL request do not show the basic follow-up needed to verify what was delivered, who received assistance, or whether funds were distributed fairly and lawfully.

In short, disbursement was not accompanied by oversight. To the extent funds actually left City Hall, the City appears to have stopped asking questions once the checks cleared.

Finally, while 2024 marked the year City officials seemed to remember that ARPA was supposed to offer direct assistance to residents, when we zoom out, we see that across the City’s $41,108,657 ARPA award, less than 5% went to direct relief for Mount Vernon residents.

I. Mayor’s Guaranteed Income Program

Guaranteed Income (“GI”) programs provide regular, no-strings-attached cash payments—often monthly stipends—to help individuals meet basic needs, reduce poverty, and build financial stability. These programs are typically temporary pilot initiatives, publicly or privately funded, and differ from traditional welfare programs in that funds may be spent without restrictions.

Between 2023 and 2024, the City spent $1 million in ARPA funds on the Mayor’s Guaranteed Income program, purchasing 2,000 $500 gift cards to be distributed monthly to 200 low-income individuals or families for one year. Eligibility was based on annual income limits.

Interestingly, the ordinance authorizing the program raised the approved amount to $1.65 million from $1.2 million. But the City’s receipts show purchases totaling only $1 million, while the City’s federal ARPA reports show expenditures of $1.2 million. No records were produced showing actual distribution to recipients.

Presumably, however, somewhere out there are 200 low-income individuals or families who received $500 per month for a year—$6,000 each.

II. The “Community Development” Catchall

The City spent more than $700,000 in ARPA funds under the broad category of “Community Development.” Some expenditures appear, on their face, to support worthwhile community efforts:

• 914Lock received $25,000 to purchase a transport van for food distribution and hot meals for vulnerable populations. The contract covered October 25, 2024, through December 31, 2024, and required weekly hot meal delivery to an average of 200 people per month. No documentation shows where or whether meals were delivered.
• Y-COP received $25,000 to purchase a 15-passenger van to transport program participants. The contract covered May 1, 2024, through May 30, 2025, but contained no substantive programmatic requirements, effectively functioning as a vehicle donation.
• Mercy University received $200,000 (of a $400,000 commitment) for administrative support and academic oversight of the City’s Financial Empowerment Center. The contract term runs from January 16, 2024, through January 16, 2026.

Beyond these, the record becomes increasingly problematic. A proliferation of small business grants—many purportedly for afterschool or community programs—lacks evidence that the programs ever occurred. With few exceptions, files contain no monitoring reports, attendance records, proof of service delivery, evaluations, or other documentation showing that funded activities took place.

In many cases, contract “scopes of work” are so vague that merely operating a business would satisfy the requirements. For example, Cluster Inc. received $20,000 to “provide services to the Mount Vernon community that will directory impact the youth and strength of the community.”

Even where scopes were more detailed, narratives often describe routine business expenses—such as payroll—rather than addressing a COVID-related impact. When receipts are included, they typically confirm only that someone was paid, not that services were delivered. On their face, many of these programs appear community-run and community-focused, but the documentation does not substantiate that appearance.

Several grants raise more serious concerns regarding conflicts of interest and oversight failures:

• Friends of Mount Vernon Arts, Recreation, and Youth Programs received $60,000. The charity is run by Comptroller Darren Morton and other City Hall employees. The contract term was June 1, 2024, through July 30, 2025, to fund youth sports programming. No documentation shows that services were delivered. Most troubling, the disbursement checks were co-signed by Comptroller Morton himself.
• Westchester Latinos Unidos received $30,000. The organization is run by Elvira Castillo, a 2024 City Council candidate who ran on the Mayor and developer supported RiseUp Mount Vernon slate. Funds were to support four ESL classes and four citizenship classes. No documentation shows that these services occurred.
• Friendship for Tots received $20,000 to fund instructors providing wraparound services for children ages 2 to 6. The contract ran from March 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025. While the file contains payroll summaries, there is no evidence that contracted services were delivered.
• The Revelators, a Yonkers-based arts program, received $20,000 for a two-day run of The Story at the Doles Center on November 16–17, 2024. The organization lists an “office” at an apartment complex in Mount Vernon. No documentation shows that performances occurred. Receipts show a bizarre array of charged expenses including $500 to “clean and sanitize” a car, nearly $3,000 for car repairs, children’s clothing, gluten-free chewable enzymes, several random meals, $250 for a NYS inspection, and $637 for Geico insurance.
• Ernest Davis, via ED Davis Corp, received $16,000 as landlord of The Peoples Pantry to cover rent and utilities. The contract covered calendar year 2024. The supporting lease is unsigned by any tenant and bears only Mr. Davis’s signature, rendering it invalid.

This is not a paperwork quibble. Under ARPA, municipalities were required to ensure that funded programs served eligible populations, addressed pandemic-related harms, and actually occurred. Payment alone did not satisfy that obligation; oversight was required after disbursement.

In 2024, Mount Vernon treated ARPA payments as the end of the process rather than the beginning of accountability. If the City cannot demonstrate service delivery, it cannot demonstrate compliance. And without compliance, it cannot credibly claim recovery.

III. More Demolition

In 2024, the City spent $717,100 on demolition, including $91,500 for a privately owned property at 19 South Terrace Avenue and $618,300 for a City-owned property at 205 South Fifth Avenue. In both cases, the City declared an “emergency” to justify the use of ARPA funds.

While demolition of unsafe structures can, under certain circumstances, be a permissible use of ARPA funds, the manner in which the City invoked ARPA here reflects chronic mismanagement rather than a clear, well-documented public health response.

• 19 South Terrace Avenue is a privately owned property that has been vacant since 2016 due to structural instability. Long before the COVID-19 pandemic, the property had experienced multiple fires and had been the subject of repeated complaints from neighboring residents regarding unsafe conditions. Despite years of notice and enforcement authority, the City failed to compel the private owner to remediate or demolish the structure. In effect, the only new “emergency” was the availability of ARPA funds. Particularly troubling, the ordinance authorizing the demolition contains no provision requiring the City to recover the cost of demolition from the private owner, either through a lien, repayment agreement, or recovery upon sale of the property.
• 205 South Fifth Avenue, now owned by the City through the Urban Renewal Agency, presents a similar pattern of delayed action. The ordinance authorizing demolition acknowledges an Unsafe Building violation dating back to December 3, 2009, and confirms that the building was vacated in February 2016 due to structural instability. The dangerous condition of the property persisted for years, including after City acquisition. Although a partial collapse of a retaining wall in June 2024 heightened the urgency, the underlying hazards were neither new nor unforeseen. The City’s reliance on ARPA funds to address conditions that had been allowed to deteriorate for nearly a decade reflects reactive crisis management, not a deliberate, well-planned use of federal relief funding.

Taken together, these demolitions illustrate a broader pattern of ARPA mismanagement, characterized by a reliance on emergency declarations to justify expenditures for long-known hazards and substituting the use of federal relief funds for routine code enforcement and asset management.

ARPA was intended to address extraordinary COVID-related harms—not to backstop years of deferred action. Even where these demolitions may be defensible on safety grounds, the City’s approach exposes it to audit and clawback risk.

IV. More Vehicles

The City continued its profligate vehicle spending. In 2024, ARPA funds were used to purchase $784,320 in vehicles, including a $72,382 2024 Chevy Tahoe for Damani Bush—the same vehicle residents report seeing parked outside bars and other non-City establishments during non-business hours.

V. What Did ARPA Spending in 2024 Tell Us?

By 2024, it was unmistakably clear that there was never a strategy for real economic recovery, and certainly not one that involved direct relief to residents. The handful of resident-facing expenditures that finally appear in the records—guaranteed income, small business grants, nonprofit programming—do not reflect a coordinated effort to meet identified needs. They appear late, scattered, and largely untethered to outcomes, eligibility, or verification.

The pattern is broadly consistent:

• Direct assistance was minimal in scale relative to the City’s overall ARPA allocation.
• Programs labeled as “community” lacked defined objectives, measurable outcomes, or proof of delivery.
• Funds flowed through intermediaries without monitoring, documentation, or follow-up.
• Relief was distributed, if at all, without a framework to ensure it reached intended populations or addressed pandemic-related impacts.

Most telling is the proportion of resources involved. Of Mount Vernon’s $41,108,657 ARPA allocation, less than 5%—and only that much if the Guaranteed Income program is included—was directed toward direct relief for residents. This is not the result of poor execution of a sound plan; it is evidence that direct community assistance was never a priority.

The overwhelming majority of funds were absorbed by City operations—vehicles, demolition projects, software, and similar expenditures—many of them undertaken without foresight and now imposing ongoing costs the City cannot sustain now that the ARPA funding stream has run dry.

VI. Conclusion: Spending Without Recovery

By the end of 2024, Mount Vernon had spent or obligated most of its ARPA funds without ever building a system of accountability. The City treated ARPA as a windfall rather than a responsibility, and compliance as an afterthought rather than a prerequisite.

Recovery requires more spending. It requires asking hard questions, making tough decisions, demanding proof, and following the money all the way to its intended impact. In 2024, Mount Vernon did none of those things.

What remains is not a record of recovery, but a record of abdication—one that helped propel the City toward the fiscal cliff we recently fell off of when City Council raised our property taxes yet again. And we are not done falling.

Coming Up in Part 6 — ARPA in Mount Vernon: 2025, The Final Year
How a $41 Million Gift Becomes A 5.5% Tax Increase and Imminent Bankruptcy